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Russian citizens owe it to Boris Nemtsov to keep the hope of
democracy in Russia alive
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Following the murder of Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, a commemorative march was
held by tens of thousands of people in Moscow and other Russian cities on 1 March. Tomila
Lankina writes on the contribution Nemtsov made to politics within Russia and what his death
means for the country’s opposition movements.
I ﬁrst heard of Boris Nemtsov when I was a young Russian graduate student in America in the mid-
1990s contemplating pursuing a PhD in Russian regional politics. For a new, post-Kremlinologist
generation of political scientists, it was individuals like Nemtsov who made the study of Russian
provincial politics fascinating and exciting.
In the post-Soviet hyper-federalist Russia of the early Yeltsin years, sub-national regions quickly emerged as
powerful players in their own right, shaping regional and national politics. As a governor of the Nizhny Novgorod
region, still only in his early thirties (he was only thirty two when he became Governor), Nemtsov was already a star
– well before he entered national politics as Deputy Prime Minister. Nemtsov led the democratic transformation of
the region, creating an atmosphere of political openness, attracting foreign investment, and supporting independent
media and civil society.
To scholars of Russian regional politics, Nemtsov’s
governorship is associated with the most vibrant
period in the history of Russian federalism. I hesitate
to use the expression ‘golden age’ because Yeltsin-
era federal relations were also associated with ad
hoc and preferential politically motivated deals with
regional bosses that in some cases helped promote
regional authoritarianism, nepotism, and corruption.
Yet regions like Nizhny stood out as islands of sub-
national openness, while governors like Nemtsov
helped keep in check excessive concentration of
power in the national executive, shaping national
policy and public opinion in the process. In 1996, he
organised a signature campaign against the war in
Chechnya, collecting one million signatures in the
Nizhny Novgorod region on a petition to Yeltsin and
calling on other regions to support his initiative.
Putin’s recentralisation drive of the early 2000s ensured that even the hitherto politically open regions would turn into
vassal-like dependencies of the Kremlin, delivering blatantly fraudulent electoral support to the national incumbent.
Back in the 1990s, however, the more politically competitive regions could and did shape national political
landscapes. While other ﬁgures of that era such as Murtaza Rakhimov, Mintimer Shaimiev and Kirsan Ilyumzhinov –
the long-serving presidents of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan and Kalmykia – will be associated in the public mind with
patrimonialism and grotesque forms of neo-Soviet sub-national authoritarianism, Nemtsov will be remembered as a
democratic, public-minded, governor.
1/2
Nemtsov’s subsequent career trajectory also mirrors the brief episode in Russia’s political history when talented,
principled, democratic politicians could wield real power within the country. As a First Deputy Prime Minister in
Yeltsin’s government, along with other democratic politicians, Nemtsov – once reputed to be Russia’s “most popular
politician” – sought to steer the country to a level of international respectability, acceptance, and normality that have
long since ceased to be features of Russian politics. Gone are the days when merit and leadership qualities could
elevate individuals of Nemtsov’s calibre to national and international prominence. Many people of talent, like
Nemtsov, have either left the corridors of Russian power at their own volition as a matter of principle, been forced
out, or have opted to join the swelling ranks of Russia’s political émigrés residing abroad.
And yet, unlike many other regime critics who had been silenced or intimidated, Nemtsov was to become the leading
opposition ﬁgure in the next chapter of Russia’s political history. This is the period when the Russian parliament
became progressively ‘zombiﬁed’, with citizen inputs into public policy being increasingly institutionalised outside of
the country’s formal political decision making processes. As a consequence, any attempts to inﬂuence politics and
public policy had to acquire extra-institutional contours.
Again, Nemtsov was to emerge as one of the most prominent leaders of this risky and perilous process. Denied the
possibility to engage in parliamentary politics, he sought to promote unity among the ranks of the fragmented and
marginalised “extra-systemic” democratic opposition. Most importantly, Nemtsov kept street politics alive, helping to
organise street marches and other extra-institutional avenues for citizens to articulate grievances, against the
backdrop of rising militancy among anti-opposition movements.
Nemtsov took a principled stance on the annexation of Crimea at a time when such a stance was becoming
unpopular not just among the wider public, but also among some of those one would previously consider to be
‘liberals’. Russia’s war in Ukraine was to be among the central rallying cries of the ‘Spring’ popular demonstration on
1 March that Nemtsov took the lead in organising, but was not destined to see.
Following Nemtsov’s brutal assassination, the demonstration became a commemorative procession, honouring his
life and involving at least 50,000 people in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and in Russia’s other cities. Putin’s paranoid
autocracy and his orgy of repression have not succeeded in exterminating the surviving islands of integrity, free
spirit, and courage across the country. We Russians owe it to Boris Nemtsov for helping to keep the hope of
democracy in Russia alive, and for reﬂecting on our own share of responsibility for making it happen.
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